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INC: ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR STORED PRINT JOBS

Additional Security for Stored Print Jobs
Abstract
Modern printers have a provision to receive print jobs from remote client devices over network and keep them as stored jobs.
At the time of sending a print job, user (at client device) has a choice to associate a PIN with the job and have it stored in
encrypted format on the printer. Even though the combination of the two seem good enough to secure user’s print data, but
this safety relies totally on the confidentiality of the PIN – once the PIN has been leaked, the data safety is compromised.
In today’s world when computing machines are capable of strong brute force attacks, the PIN alone cannot be considered
safe enough.
This paper proposes a solution to the problem by bringing in additional security of keeping the print ready data with the user
instead of sending it to the printer for safekeeping.

Problem Statement
To send a print job, client devices make use of the print driver installed on them to convert the to‐be‐printed file into print
ready data, e.g. PRN format, and would dispatch the same to printer to be stored as a stored job. User can come to the printer
later and take physical print outs against the job. User can attach a PIN to the job and let the printer store it in encrypted
form to maintain the confidentiality of the data.
These measures safeguard the user data in multiple ways e.g. PIN provides safety from un‐authenticated users and encryption
secures data during communication over network and on the printer storage. But, the data is still prone to brute force attacks
since malwares can easily target not‐so‐complex user defined PINs. Neither can we rule out the possibility of ever increasing
social engineering threats with respect to PIN stealing.

Prior Solutions
There is no known solution which secures stored jobs even if the respective PIN has been compromised.

Proposed Solution
Storing print data on user media (USB mass storage) as opposed to storing it on the print infrastructure
The solution revolves around the concept of print user’s data being the safest when it’s with him. User can send the printer a few
metadata items (PIN, File Name etc.) pertaining to the desired stored job, and the printer would create a stored job skeletal
thereby. The skeletal would be having all the looks and feels of a stored job at its Front Panel, but the print data would be missing
from it. The print data would be kept by the user, which can be carried to the printer in a USB mass storage at the time of actual
printing.
The following steps summarize the whole workflow: ‐

Job Submission (Client Device): ( Figure1)
1) Printer driver on the client device would provide a new option "Secure stored jobs on mass storage device (with
encryption and password)", which user can choose for the job submission.

2) Print file is converted into print ready format, this data is encrypted, PIN is received as user input, and a unique JOB‐ID is
created.
3) JOB‐ID, encryption, PIN and the file name are dispatched to the printer; printer creates a stored job skeletal with these
values which would look like any other stored job.
4) User gets the "Save As" option to store the encrypted print data (along with JOB‐ID) on client device. User can directly
save it to a USB mass storage or can copy there later.

Job Retrieval (Printer): ( Figure2)
A) User chooses a stored job from printer's Front Panel to print.
B) If it is "Secure stored job on mass storage device", user is prompted (on printer Front Panel) to insert the USB mass
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C) Printer firmware fetches the JOB‐ID and the encrypted print data from USB mass storage (from Step (3)), to get the
actual print‐ready data. It then asks the user for the PIN.
D) If PIN validation succeeds, the print data is decrypted (using methods from Step (3)) and the job is processed
successfully
The below flow‐charts explain these sequence of operations: ‐

User submits a print

Is secure stored

No

Print job is stored in the printer

Yes

data is encrypted

Pin is obtained from the user and a unique JOB ID is

sent to the printer and listed in stored jobs

User stores this encrypted data on the mass storage

Stop

Figure 1: Job Submission on the client device
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User selects a stored job from the list displayed

No

Is selected job a secure stored job

Please insert mass storage device containing the print data” message is

Data missing
device connected contains

Data present
Mismatch

Match
User is asked to enter the PIN

Failed
Success

Figure 2: Job Retrieval on the printer

Advantages
1. The proposed method safeguards the print data even if PIN has been leaked since the hacker cannot get access
to the print data without physically accessing the Mass Storage Device.

2. Even if USB mass storage device with the print data has been stolen, it alone would be of no use as the
data is encrypted and can only be decrypted at the printer by entering the correct PIN.
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